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Classed attitudes and social reform in cross-national perspective: 
a quantitative analysis using four waves from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
Christopher Deeming 
Abstract 
This article attempts to forge new links between social attitudes and social policy change in 
Australia.  Drawing on four survey waves of international social survey data and using 
multivariate regression analysis, this article sheds new light on the determinants of Australian 
attitudes towards the welfare state.  It examines their variations across time and compares 
them with other leading Western economies.  While there is popular support for government 
actions to protect Australian citizens in old age and sickness, views about social protection 
and labour market policy for the working-age population are divided.  The comparative 
analysis and the focus on class-attitude linkages allows for further critical reflection on the 
nature of social relations and recent social reforms enacted by the Liberal-National coalition 
government. 
Keywords class, data analysis, political sociology, quantitative analysis, welfare state 
 
Introduction 
Much recent writing about social reform in the Australian context overlooks the importance 
of social attitudes that may help to explain change.  However, lLQNLQJ SHRSOH¶Vvalues and 
attitudes with social reform is a complex but altogether necessary endeavour if we are to 
understand more about how the modern state is being transformed.  Much of the early work 
on welfare state development points to class politics, and working-class solidarities in 
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particular, as crucial factors influencing social policies (Castles, 1985; Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  At the start of the twenty-first century, however, we now understand that 
individualizing and liberalizing market processes everywhere may be eroding important 
aspects of social solidarity; once distinctive welfare states may be losing their particularity 
under the weight of recent market reforms.  This article therefore aims to forge new linkages 
between public opinion and social change in the Australian context. 
The analysis is supported by data on comparative welfare attitudes from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (Haller et al., 2012).  Using multivariate regression 
techniques, we consider Australian preferences for risk protection.  We are particularly 
interested in comparing Australian welfare state attitudes with views found elsewhere, but we 
are also interested in social attitudes defined by socio-demographic characteristics including 
µclass¶HIIHFWVLQWKHGDWD(here 'social class' is defined by the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero 
(EGP) class scheme, see Leiulfsrud et al., 2010).  In the analysis, we rely on all four waves of 
the ISSP Role of Government (RoG) module for our sample of leading Western economies 
that includes Australia.  The time span is a twenty-year period and the total country-wave 
sample comprises over 43,000 records.  Before describing the study methods and results and 
discussing their implications, we consider the scholarship that discusses the links between 
welfare state attitudes and social policy development. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
Esping-Andersen argues that, according to the logic of industrialism, the µZHOIDUHVWDWH¶Zas a 
functional response to working-class mobilization (in political parties and unions) and the 
needs of industrial capitalist society (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  Welfare states secured 
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citizens against risk.  Their objective was to protect (by guaranteeing a substitute income) 
male breadwinner wages from the social risks of the day: unemployment, sickness and old 
age.  Although social welfare systems (comprising health, pensions and social security 
provisions) differed across the industrial nations ± suggesting national traditions and cultural 
factors at play ± nevertheless, the emphasis of social policy was placed on full employment 
(following Keynesian principles) and the protection of working-class families within the 
capitalist state.  In the liberal market economies of Australia and New Zealand, for example, 
social protection was largely delivered through a family wage policy (Castles, 1985).  In the 
United States, targeted social welfare programs expanded under the New Deal, while in 
%ULWDLQWKHµ%HYHULGJHDQ¶WD[-financed welfare state offered a needs-based and means-tested 
safety net.  Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and the UK are said to conform more to the 
µOLEHUDO¶PRGHORIZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVP (Esping-Andersen, 1990), in the sense that this model 
represents strong elements of individualism, opposition to state intervention, marketization 
and the commodification of labour.  In Continental Europe, µVocietal FRUSRUDWLVP¶HPHUJHG
RXWRILQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQZLWKµ%LVPDUNLDQ¶V\VWHPVRIZRUNHULQVXUDQFHDQGFRPSDQ\-based 
social protection schemes in France and Germany.  In Scandinavia, Social Democratic 
governments in the pursuit of equality developed the universaOPRGHORIµZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVP¶ 
± a broad sense of µsolidarity¶ (with middle-class support) ± came much more easily in the 
Nordic nations than did either individualism or corporatism, as Esping-Andersen (1990) 
observes. 
As Svallfors (2006) suggests, welfare states may foster and promote social solidarity and 
they may also reflect it (or the lack of it).  Thus, if welfare states have a tendency to produce 
and reproduce their own legitimacy, from a comparative policy perspective, we might 
therefore expect welfare attitudes to diverge across the advanced societies, to reflect ± at least 
in part ± dominant welfare state ideology.  As our point of departure, we might assume that 
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there is regime-related variation in welfare attitudes in the international social survey data.  
As previous research suggests, people in the Nordic world tend to be most favourable to 
government action, while people in liberal market economies are significantly less favourable 
towards governmental action than people in the Bismarkian nations of Europe (e.g. Svallfors, 
1997; Jæger, 2011).  However, it does not automatically follow that all Australian citizens 
stand against state actions or particular governmental programmes.  Further, scholars now 
argue that once distinctive welfare regime types are losing their distinctiveness under the 
weight of reform.  TRGD\¶V GLYHUVH PXOWL-faceted welfare systems often challenge 
straightforward typologies and policymakers in the Bismarkian and Nordic countries are now 
turning to characteristically market liberal activation measures to increase labour market 
entry (Lodemel and Moreira, 2014).  Institutional differences remain (there are different 
µDFWLYDWLRQ¶ DQGµZRUNIDUH¶ regimes, as shown in Table 1).  However, attitudinal cleavages, 
once clearly visible between the worlds of welfare, may soften and diminish with the arrival 
of activation policies everywhere.  In Australia, for example, µjobseekers¶ are now obliged to 
undertake work commitments in exchange for access to social benefits under Tony Abbott¶V
QHZµZRUNIDUH¶UHJLPH. 
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Table 1. Worlds of µZHOIDUH¶DQGYDULHWLHVRIµZRUNIDUH¶ 
 Corporatist welfare 
states 
Liberal welfare 
states 
Social-democratic 
welfare states 
 Wel f a re  s tra teg i e s  
Orientation Social protection, 
stabilization. 
 
Market-orientated. Social citizenship and 
pursuit of equality. 
Welfare model Categorical design of 
social programs and 
corporatist labour-
market relations. 
 
Means-tested and 
residual assistance. 
Universal programs 
and fusion of 
welfare/work. 
Labour-market 
policy 
Active, geared to rise 
in unemployment. 
 
Passive income 
support. 
Active, geared towards 
social investment. 
Ideology Corporatism and status 
based rights. 
Market individualist 
problematisation, 
stigmatization of 
welfare. 
 
Universal rights and 
shared responsibilities, 
positive welfare 
orientation. 
 Wo r kf a re  s tra teg i e s  
Orientation Statist, emphasis on 
skilling and tackling 
structural 
unemployment. 
Market individualist, 
emphasis on work-
conditionality to 
FRXQWHUµZHOIDUH
GHSHQGHQF\¶ 
 
Social, labour-market 
adjustments. 
Workfare model Labour-market 
reintegration, active 
labour market policies 
and stricter activation 
measures. 
 
µ:RUN-ILUVW¶DQ\MRE
is better than 
inactivity) and 
restriction of welfare 
entitlements with 
increased work-
conditionality. 
 
Human-capital 
approach and 
investment and 
increased welfare-
conditionality 
Ideology Work values with 
continuing 
commitment to status 
based rights. 
 
Moral regulation, 
work ethos, discipline 
and social control. 
 
Structural 
reorientation of 
welfarist approach. 
Source: Adapted from Lodemel and Moreira (2014). 
 
Welfare state attitudes often vary within countries, depending on the sphere of welfare 
provision in question.  Some social groups in society are perceived as more deserving than 
others (Papadakis, 1990; Jæger, 2007).  For example, older people are traditionally perceived 
to be more deserving than unemployed people are.  There are also socioeconomic correlates 
between different types of welfare attitudes.  Previous research suggests that working-class 
representatives are more likely to support governmental interventions compared to middle-
class representatives, particularly with regard to statutory interventions in case of sickness 
and old age (e.g. Svallfors, 2006; Jæger, 2007).  However, we know little about solidarity and 
class-welfare relations within the Australian context.  As the Australian system of welfare is 
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transformed to encourage greater labour market participation, we need to ask: will social 
cleavages become more pronounced or less? Labour market flexibility and non-standard 
employment have meant increased insecurity for many Australians.  Under these 
circumstances, we might expect class awareness and solidarity to increase, as writers like 
Curran (2013) suggest.  From this perspective, working-class citizens in Australia are more 
likely than middle-class citizens to support welfare state and governmental programmes that 
safeguard their interests, particularly full employment policies and social policies that protect 
their living standards in the event unemployment, as well as  social policies that offer 
protection against poverty in old age. 
On the other hand, once firm politically oriented allegiances have become less secure in 
modern societies, class cleavages may diminish.  The working class is said to be in decline 
with the loss of industry DQGQRWLRQVRI µFODVV VWUXJJOH¶ DVRSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQFDSLWDO DQG
labour) now appear to be less apparent in political life (Beck and Grande, 2010).  A new 
VSDFHKDVRSHQHGXSIRULQGLYLGXDOVLQVHDUFKRIµLQGLYLGXDOL]HG¶OLIHVW\OHV.  This is part of the 
SURFHVV RI µLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ¶ ZLWK FLYLF LQVWLWXWLRQV QRZ WDLORUHG WR LQGLYLGXDO FRQFHUQV.  
New solidarities may emerge or become significant in response to µrisk society¶, to do with 
age, gender, education or religion (Beck and Grande, 2010).  Religious and ethnic views may 
become relevant, insofar as they may divide or weaken traditional class-based forms of 
welfare solidarity.  Cultural and political liberalism, for instance, have been linked to the rise 
of the professional class.  Higher education, which has expanded beyond recognition, is also 
associated with liberal values and individualism.  Crucially, the µOHJLWLPDF\¶of governmental 
interventions may depend on the continued support of middle-class citizens, as Svallfors 
(2006) argues.  With the extension of individualistic and market-orientated welfare 
arrangements, however, their support cannot be taken for granted.  Arguably, the new 
activation measures are designed to foster adaptability whereby more affluent citizens seek to 
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minimize their own exposure to risk, at the expense of risk pooling, as Keune and Serrano 
(2014) observe. 
In order to understand the trajectory of Australian social reform in a comparative fashion, 
we examine changing public attitudes towards risk and welfare protection in Australia and 
other leading Western economies over the last twenty years.  However, if we are to shed 
further light on recent social reforms and their political impacts, we also require a more 
comprehensive understanding of (changing) solidarities in Australia defined by traditional 
indictors of welfare allegiance, such as partisanship and class (plus class-related factors, such 
as income and education). 
 
Methods 
The comparative welfare analysis reported here relies heavily on survey data from all four 
rounds of the ISSP RoG: wave I-IV conducted in 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 (ISSP Research 
Group, 2008).  The ISSP is an important international social survey collaboration providing 
cross-national and cross-cultural perspectives on key research topics in the social sciences 
(Haller et al., 2012).  It follows a repeated cross-sectional survey design and employs 
sampling procedures in an attempt to ensure that views are nationally representative of all 
individuals aged over fifteen years who reside within private households in the participating 
countries.  In the analysis, we are interested in situating Australian welfare state attitudes in a 
comparative context, across time and national policy contexts, and we are interested in social 
attitudes defined by socio-demographic characteristics including class.  The time span is a 
twenty-year period and the total country-wave sample comprises over 43,000 respondents 
(see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Country-wave study sample 
 
Wave I 
(1985) 
Wave II 
(1990) 
Wave III 
(1996) 
Wave IV 
(2006) 
Totals 
Australia (AUS) 1,528 2,398 2,151 2,781 8,858 
Denmark (DNK) 
- 
- - 1,368 1,368 
Finland (FIN) 
- 
- - 1,189 1,189 
France (FRA) 
- 
- 1,312 1,824 3,136 
Germany (DEU)Į 1,048 3,840 3,470 1,643 10,001 
New Zealand (NZL) 
- 
- 1,198 1,263 2,461 
Norway (NOR) 
- 
1,517 1,344 1,330 4,191 
Sweden (SWE) 
- 
- 1,238 1,194 2,432 
United Kingdom (GBR) 1,530 1,197 989 930 4,646 
United States (USA) 677 1,217 1,332 1,518 4,744 
Totals 4,783 10,169 13,034 15,040 43,026 
Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Role of Government (RoG) I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
Notes: ĮWave I covered West Germany only, from Wave II Germany (inc. East). 
 
The RoG module asks respondents a series of questions about preferences for risk protection 
across different social welfare functions and different population groups.  For example, 
respondents were asked whether it should or should not EHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶s responsibility to 
do the following: 
x provide healthcare for the sick;  
x provide a decent standard of living for old people;  
x provide a decent standard of living for unemployed people; and 
x provide a job for everyone.   
The UHVSRQGHQWV¶opinions on these four questions is the object of our analysis.  The response 
categories ZHUH µGHILQLWHO\ VKRXOG EH¶, µSUREDEO\ VKRXOG EH¶ µSUREDEO\ VKRXOG QRW EH¶, 
µGHILQLWHO\VKRXOGQRWEH¶ DQGµFDQ¶WFKRRVH¶.  The dependent variables were constructed from 
the four questions, responses being binary coded into positive (definitely should, probably 
should) and negative (definitely should not, probably should not) attitudes towards the 
welfare state.  The µFDQ¶W FKRRVH¶ category was treated as missing data.  The explanatory 
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variables are µdummy coded¶, e.g., female dummy variable, unemployed dummy variable 
etc., shown in Table 3.  In the analysis, the Nordic countries are represented by Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden.  We include the µcorporatist¶ countries of France and 
Germany, and the liberal market economies of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
 
Table 3. Dependent and independent variables 
Variable Variable label Specification in the study 
AGE Age Welfare attitudes may be age related. Age is coded into 6 
groups. 
SEX Sex Gender may help to explain social attitudes. 
DEGREE Education II-highest education level (GXFDWLRQDWWDLQPHQWUHFRGHGLQWRWKUHHFDWHJRULHVµGHJUHH¶
µEHORZGHJUHHOHYHO¶µQRTXDOLILFDWLRQV¶ 
WRKST Current employment status /DERXUIRUFHSDUWLFLSDWLRQFRGHGµHPSOR\HG¶µXQHPSOR\HG¶
RUµHFRQRPLFDOO\LQDFWLYH¶WKHODWWHUFRYHULQJSHRSOHLQ
HGXFDWLRQUHWLUHPHQWDQGXQSDLGIDPLO\ZRUNHUV¶ 
ISCO88 Occupation ILO/ISCO Class is likely to be important. EGP class scheme: 
professionals, salaried white-collar employees, skilled manual, 
and low-skilled manual workers. 
PARTY_LR Party affiliation Political views are likely to important explanatory variables, 
here we consider: left, centre, right affiliation. 
V6 Country United States (USA), United Kingdom (GBR), Australia 
(AUS), Germany (DEU), France (FRA), Norway (NOR), New 
Zealand (NZL), Sweden (SWE). Denmark and Finland only 
participated in the latest survey wave and therefore cannot be 
included in the time-variant regression analysis. 
V4 Wave/Year Attitudes may be time-variant. Here we consider changes over 
wave III (1996) and IV (2006). Discontinuity with occupation 
coding means it is not possible to include the first two survey 
waves. 
V50 Government responsibility: Provide 
jobs for everyone. 
$QVZHUVRISUREDEO\DQGGHILQLWHO\DUHFRGHGµ\HV¶SUREDEO\ 
QRWDQGGHILQLWHO\QRWDUHFRGHGµQR¶ 
V52 Government responsibility: Healthcare $QVZHUVRISUREDEO\DQGGHILQLWHO\DUHFRGHGµ\HV¶SUREDEO\
QRWDQGGHILQLWHO\QRWDUHFRGHGµQR¶ 
V53 Government responsibility: Provide 
decent living standard for the old. 
$QVZHUVRISUREDEO\DQGGHILQLWHO\DUHFRGHGµ\HV¶SUREDEO\
QRWDQGGHILQLWHO\QRWDUHFRGHGµQR¶ 
V55 Government responsibility: Provide 
decent living standard for unemployed. 
$QVZHUVRISUREDEO\DQGGHILQLWHO\DUHFRGHGµ\HV¶SUREDEO\
not and definLWHO\QRWDUHFRGHGµQR¶ 
WEIGHT Weighting factor All study calculations are weighted. 
Source: ISSP Role of Government I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
 
While µsRFLDOFODVV¶is a key variable in the analysis, it remains a deeply contested concept in 
the social sciences, as Haddon (2014) observes.  Here we adopt the standard EGP class 
scheme that is widely used in international and comparative research, which relies on 
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occupational status (Leiulfsrud et al., 2010).  EGP classes were created using the SPSS-
program developed by Ganzeboom et al.  (1992), based on the ISCO-88 occupational codes 
available in the latest survey rounds.  The class analysis focuses on survey data from waves 
three and four; fundamental changes to the way occupation is coded means the earlier rounds 
cannot be included.1 According to the theory in question, classes are aggregations of 
positions within the labour market.  Across the whole sample, we observe the following 
structure: one-third of the working population belong to the professional and higher 
managerial occupations classes and one-third belong to the µsalariat¶ (the salaried white-
collar employees).  Thirteen percent of the working classes are in skilled manual occupations 
and seventeen percent are low-skilled workers.  The reduction of class to occupation 
WKUHDWHQV WR OHDYH RXW RI WKH PRGHO WKRVH FLWL]HQV ZKR DUH µXQHPSOR\HG¶ i.e., the benefit-
GHSHQGHQWJURXSDQGWKRVHFLWL]HQVZKRµeconomically inactive¶ (i.e., people not in work or 
seeking employment: pensioners and the retired population, students or unpaid family 
workers and carers).  In the analysis, however, other socio-demographic variables are 
included to produce a multifactoral approach to class and social relations (including labour 
force status; see Table 3). 
We begin with a descriptive overview and analysis of the data before using multivariate 
logistic regression models for binary outcomes (cf. Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) to assess 
the socio-demographic characteristics that help to explain or predict attitudes to welfare state 
functions in Australia and the other leading economies.  In other words, we are interested in 
attitudinal differences at the aggregate level, in terms of cross-national and welfare regime-
related variations and effects, as well as the interaction of aggregate level and individual level 
characteristics captured by the social survey.  The odds ratios in the results (Tables 4 and 5) 
show the strength and the direction of the independent predictors µLQGHSHQGHQW¶KHUH means 
after taking account of all of the other demographic and socioeconomic variables in the 
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model).  The R-statistic indicates the proportion of variability in the model and asterisks 
indicate the level of significance.2 Much of the discussion focuses on the multivariate results 
in Tables 4 and 5, with cross-referencing to the effects for country and class in Table 6.  All 
study calculations are weighted to correct for differential and non-response bias in the survey 
data. 
 
Results 
In the survey data, we find that there is almost universal support across nations for 
governmental actions to ensure decent living standards in old age (Figure 1) and healthcare 
for the sick (Figure 2).  In Australia, and even the USA where public support for social 
welfare is at its lowest, we still find the overwhelming majority of people claiming that these 
social programmes are functions of good government.  The latest survey wave of 2007 
revealed  that over 90 percent of Australians believe that government intervention in the 
market is justified to provide a decent standard of living for workers in retirement; over 90 
percent of Australians also believe that access to healthcare is a social right.  The available 
survey evidence suggests that Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard did not misinterpret the nature of 
support in Australia for better aged pensions and a better healthcare system.  Under Labor 
(2007-2013), the minimum income floor for pensioners was raised against average weekly 
male earnings and the health service, which had been fragmented on state lines and under 
different tiers of government, was significantly strengthened with new funding for health and 
hospital services (National Health and Hospitals Network Act 2011). 
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Figure 1. Decent living standard for old people: Percentage claiming 
it should be the government¶V responsibility, by country and wave  
 
Source: ISSP RoG I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
 
Figure 2. Healthcare for the sick: Percentage claiming it should 
EHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶Vresponsibility, by country and wave 
 
Source: ISSP RoG I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
 
Attitudes towards collective social policy that guards against unemployment risks, however, 
are much more variable.  Nearly one-half of all Australians claimed that the government 
should not be responsible for providing decent living standards for unemployed people in all 
four waves of the RoG module (Figure 3).  A similar picture emerges in the USA.  However, 
in the UK and New Zealand, solidarity with unemployed citizens has declined over the last 
twenty years, with one-half of the public surveyed now saying that the government should 
not be responsible for the living standards of unemployed people.  Much has been written 
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about Australasian and American exceptionalism in social policy.  Most of this literature 
focuses  on the individualistic nature of liberal society influencing welfare state architecture 
and the development of the wage-earning model of welfare in Australia and New Zealand in 
particular (Castles, 1985).  Workfare policies and other regulatory labour market programmes 
that undermine collective solidarity also have a long history in the USA, where public 
support for the principles of collective security is found to be at its lowest in the study 
sample.  In Australia, the key shift to activation came much later in the 1990s, when 
successive administrations pursued strict work-conditionality policies in an effort to cut 
unemployment and spending on social programmes (Harris, 2001). 
 
Figure 3. Decent living standard for unemployed people: Percentage claiming 
it should be the government¶Vresponsibility, by country and wave  
 
Source: ISSP RoG I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
 
Universalistic solidarity for the working population emerges most strongly in the coordinated 
market economies of Northern and Continental Europe.  In Nordic countries, for example, 
less than one-fifth of the public responding to the latest survey objected to governmental 
action to protect the living standards of unemployed workers: only 10 percent did so in 
Norway (Figure 3).  In the Bismarkian nations, we find less solidarity for workers, compared 
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to the Nordics, but even so, no more than one-third of citizens in France and Germany reject 
governmental action to protect workers from unemployment risks.  By contrast, in Australia 
and other liberal market economies, there is currently little or no public consensus on the role 
of government in relation to unemployment protection (Figure 3) and labour market policy 
(Figure 4).  In the latest survey, the Australian public remains divided: 57 percent of 
Australians support the merits of collective provision for income maintenance to safeguard 
and protect citizens against unemployment risk, while 43 percent of Australians now favour 
self-insurance or some other form of individual adaptation to the new social risks imposed by 
labour market flexibility. 
Over the four survey waves, Australians also appear divided on the issue of state 
intervention in the labour market to ensure that everyone has a job (Figure 4).  In the latest 
survey, for example, 57 percent of Australians claim that LWLVQRWWKHVWDWH¶VGXW\WRHQVXUH
that everyone has a job; 43 percent say that it is.  The µrole of government¶ survey question 
DERXW µproviding a job for everyone¶ specifically relates to far-reaching actions like µIXOO
HPSOR\PHQW¶SROLFLHV, most clearly articulated in Australia in the 1940s (Harris, 2001).3 From 
1945, economic policy under the Curtin-led Labor government followed Keynesian 
principles, the Keynesian µHFRQRPLF VWDWH¶.  Thus, the value of investment was to be 
moderated by the government in order to maintain the economy in a full state of employment 
(Labor policy from 1945).  During the 1980s and 1990s, Australia, like most other developed 
countries, experienced a neoliberal backlash against state intervention in the market.  The 
Hawke Labor government (1983±91) abandoned the goal of full employment in the face of 
globalizing forces and increasing world trade.  Like its international counterparts, the 
Australian Labor Party is now content to pursue the (diminished) goal of full employability, 
as opposed to full employment. 
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Figure 4. Jobs for everyone: Percentage claiming it should not 
be the government¶Vresponsibility, by country and wave 
 
Source: ISSP RoG I-IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008). 
 
In the liberal group of nations as a whole, we find that negative public attitudes towards state-
led job-creation schemes have been constant over all four of the survey waves.  Policy 
design, historical institutions and discourse can shape public attitudes.  In other words, the 
liberal model of welfare state capitalism (based on strong elements of individualism, the 
commodification of labour, free markets and a minimum of state interference) provides 
feedback effects that impact on public attitudes.  The level of state investment in human 
capital policies and active labour market programmes (ALMPs) in Australia and the other 
liberal market economies have a dominant laissez-faire ideology remains relatively low by 
comparison to the coordinated market economies of Northern and Continental Europe and 
their effectiveness to generate successful employment outcomes in the Australian context is 
questionable (OECD, 2013).4 By contrast, full employment policies and state-led job-creation 
schemes are strongly favoured in the coordinated market economies of Northern and 
Continental Europe (Figure 4).  As Esping-Andersen (1990) observes, the universalistic 
Nordic model of welfare depended entirely on employment maximization and the state 
therefore played a key role in securing this goal, implementing ALMPs to ensure people had 
work.  Policy feedback effects appear to reinforce support for the status quo (Svallfors, 
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2006).  The strongest level of support for state-led job-creation is found in Norway, where 
about four-fifths of the population surveyed believe that the state should ensure unemployed 
workers have jobs (Figure 4).  Not far behind Norway come the corporatist economies of 
France and Germany, both of whom have strong ALMP traditions (Lodemel and Moreira, 
2014).  In these countries, most citizens surveyed claim that the state does have a legitimate 
responsibility to act as the employer of last resort.  Citizens in the liberal market economies, 
however, appear increasingly sceptical about this form of governmental action (Figure 4). 
In summary, we find remarkable agreement cross-nationally on the functions of state 
welfare to ensure decent living standards in old age and healthcare for the sick.  Even in the 
liberal market economies, there is close to universal support for such statutory interventions.  
At the same time, we find that public support for the range of governmental actions to protect 
workers from unemployment risks is now divided in Australia and the other liberal welfare 
states, thus revealing substantial cross-national variation.  In the next section, we focus the 
analysis in an attempt to explain this variation in attitudes.  In particular, we seek to model 
heterogeneity explicitly to shed new light on welfare state attitudes defined by socio-
demographic characteristics, including, of course, class-attitudes linkages. 
 
Multivariate results 
In the next step, regression models are used to explain or predict public attitudes towards 
labour market policy and attitudes towards social protection for workers.  Many people in 
Australia oppose governmental actions to support workers (Figures 3 and 4).  Nevertheless, 
some sections of Australian society may be more critical of state intervention than others.  
Here we want to identify more clearly those Australians who either are in favour of or are 
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against collective forms of social policy to protect the living standards of unemployed women 
and men and those Australians that agree or disagree with state intervention in the labour 
market to ensure working-age citizens have jobs. 
Beginning with the results in Table 4 relating to the question about governmental action to 
provide unemployed people with decent living standards, we find a class effect in the 
Australian data (model 1).  In Australia, low-skilled manual workers are significantly more 
inclined to support collective social policy to guard against unemployment risks than middle-
class professionals.  The observed class effects are more pronounced in the cross-national 
sample, however.  In that sample, skilled workers are also more likely to favour collective 
solutions to help mitigate risk (model 2).  Partisanship helps to account for Australian welfare 
state attitudes.  Australians with political allegiances on the left, for instance, are significantly 
more likely to be in favour of supporting state intervention to secure decent living standards 
for unemployed workers than citizens who vote for parties on the right (model 1, Table 4).  
Other things being equal, Labor voters in Australia have three times the odds of reporting that 
the state has a duty to ensure decent living standards for unemployed workers compared to 
those voters on the right. 
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Table 4. Public attitudes towards unemployment protection policy (results from the            
multivariate logistic regression analysis) 
Government responsibility to provide decent living standards for unemployed workers (comparator: not state responsibility) 
 (Model 1) 
Australian sample 
(Model 2) 
Cross-national sample 
 -b SE Exp -b SE Exp 
Constant -0.40 0.22  0.28 0.12  
Age (comparator: 15-24)       
25-44 0.26 0.19 1.30 0.01 0.09 1.01 
45-54 0.56 0.20 1.75** 0.17 0.09 1.19 
55-64 0.66 0.21 1.94*** 0.35 0.10 1.42*** 
65-74 0.71 0.24 2.03** 0.32 0.12 1.38** 
75+ 1.10 0.29 2.99*** 0.51 0.14 1.66*** 
Gender (comparator: Male)       
Female 0.15 0.09 1.16 0.20 0.05 1.23*** 
Education (comparator: Degree)       
Below Degree 0.59 0.18 0.56** -0.19 0.09 0.82* 
No qualifications 0.39 0.11 0.68*** -0.13 0.06 0.87* 
EGP social class (comparator: Professional)       
Salaried white-collar worker 0.07 0.11 1.08 0.04 0.05 1.04 
Skilled manual worker 0.03 0.16 1.03 0.16 0.08 1.18* 
Low-skilled manual worker 0.00 0.16 1.27* 0.25 0.08 1.29*** 
Labour force status (comparator: Employed)       
Economically inactive 0.01 0.39 0.99 0.94 0.18 2.57*** 
Unemployed 0.35 0.13 1.42** 0.19 0.07 1.21** 
Political Party Allegiance (comparator: Right)       
Centre 1.00 0.09 2.72*** 0.47 0.06 1.60*** 
Left 1.10 0.22 2.99*** -0.48 0.06 1.62*** 
Year (comparator: 1996)       
2006 -0.27 0.10 0.76** -0.37 0.05 0.69*** 
Country (comparator: AUS)       
USA - - - -0.22 0.11 0.80* 
GBR - - - -0.44 0.07 0.64*** 
NZL - - - -0.08 0.09 0.92 
DEU - - - 0.77 0.08 2.15*** 
FRA - - - 0.69 0.07 2.00*** 
NOR - - - 1.98 0.10 7.21*** 
SWE - - - 1.27 0.11 3.55*** 
Interactions       
Manual worker 1996 x 2006 -0.04 0.29 0.96 -0.28 0.12 0.76* 
White-collar worker 1996 x 2006 -0.48 0.16 0.62** -0.31 0.07 0.73*** 
Left voter 1996 x 2006 -0.09 0.14 0.91 -0.32 0.07 0.73*** 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.10   0.20   
Notes: Significance levels: כ<0.05; ככ<0.01; כככ<0.001. 
 
There are strong age gradients in the Australian survey data, which are also observed in the 
cross-national results, model 2.  Older adults are more likely than younger adults (aged 15-
24) to support state intervention to secure decent living standards for unemployed workers, 
after controlling for all other factors.  Surprisingly, perhaps, there is no gender effect in the 
Australian data, whereas women are much more likely than men to support government 
action in the cross-national sample (which is consistent with other findings in this field, 
Jæger, 2007).  Education is an important predictor of welfare state attitudes in Australia.  A 
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person educated to university degree level is significantly more likely to believe in collective 
security to protect the living standards of unemployed citizens, compared to people with 
educational attainment below degree level.  Unsurprisingly, unemployed Australians who 
have the highest use of state benefits tend to be most supportive of social policy, compared to 
citizens in the employed category.  Other things being equal, the odds of an unemployed 
worker claiming the state should guarantee them a decent living standard are 42 percent 
greater than the odds for a citizen in paid employment.  Governmental action to combat the 
adverse effects of unemployment is clearly of value to those citizens who are protected by the 
social policy.  Importantly, the data suggest that support for collective solutions to help 
mitigate unemployment risks has significantly declined in Australia over the past decade, 
particularly amongst white-collar workers.  In general, Australians are more pro-welfare than 
citizens in the other market liberal economies of the USA and the UK (note that the 
difference with New Zealand is non-significant, model 1, Table 4).  The highest levels of 
public support for governmental action are to be found in the Nordic nations.  At the 
extremes, for example, the odds of a Norwegian citizen claiming that the state should provide 
decent living standards for unemployed women and men are about seven times greater 
compared to an Australian citizen (model 1, Table 4).  In other words, the odds of a 
Norwegian favouring governmental intervention are five-hundred-and-eighty-three percent 
greater than the average Australian, after controlling for all other factors. 
Next, we turn to views on government action to ensure all workers have jobs (Table 5).  
Here we find strong class effects in the Australian data (model 1).  In Australia, working-
class representatives are much more inclined to support state action to ensure jobs than 
middle-class citizens.  Other things being equal, the odds of low-skilled manual workers 
supporting government intervention in favour of the unemployed are 52 percent higher than 
for professionals (observed in model 1, Table 5).  Furthermore, the odds of an unemployed 
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worker claiming that the state has a duty to ensure jobs for all Australian workers are 28 
percent greater than for an Australian who is in paid employment, after controlling for all 
other factor.  Labor voters in Australia are also significantly more likely to be in favour of 
government intervention to solve the problem of unemployment compared to voters on the 
right (model 1, Table 5).  Other things being equal, Labor voters have over twice the odds of 
saying that the state has a duty to ensure jobs for unemployed Australians compared to voters 
on the right. 
 
Table 5. Public attitudes towards full employment policy (results from the multivariate                    
logistic regression analysis) 
Government responsibility to provide jobs for unemployed workers (comparator: not state responsibility) 
 (Model 1) 
Australian sample 
(Model 2) 
Cross-national sample 
 -b SE Exp -b SE Exp 
Constant -0.76 0.22  -0.49 0.12  
Age (comparator: 15-24)       
25-44 -0.36 0.19 0.70 -0.44 0.09 0.65*** 
45-54 -0.33 0.20 0.72 -0.57 0.09 0.57*** 
55-64 -0.41 0.21 0.66* -0.64 0.10 0.53*** 
65-74 -0.47 0.24 0.63 -0.62 0.11 0.54*** 
75+ -0.22 0.28 0.81 -0.71 0.14 0.49*** 
Gender (comparator: Male)       
Female 0.33 0.09 1.39*** 0.38 0.04 1.46*** 
Education (comparator: Degree)       
Below Degree 0.03 0.19 1.03 0.55 0.08 1.74*** 
No qualifications -0.11 0.11 0.90 0.19 0.06 1.21*** 
EGP social class (comparator: Professional)       
Salaried white-collar worker 0.11 0.11 1.12 0.28 0.05 1.32*** 
Skilled manual worker 0.33 0.16 1.39* 0.46 0.07 1.58*** 
Low-skilled manual worker 0.42 0.16 1.52** 0.74 0.07 2.09*** 
Labour force status (comparator: Employed)       
Economically inactive 0.45 0.38 1.57 0.46 0.15 1.58*** 
Unemployed 0.25 0.12 1.28* 0.22 0.06 1.25*** 
Political Party Allegiance (comparator: Right)       
Centre 0.86 0.09 2.37*** 0.50 0.06 1.65*** 
Left 0.83 0.20 2.29*** -0.30 0.06 0.74*** 
Year (comparator: 1996)       
2006 -0.07 0.10 0.94 -0.25 0.05 0.78*** 
Country (comparator: AUS)       
USA - - - 0.34 0.11 1.40*** 
GBR - - - -0.19 0.07 0.83*** 
NZL - - - 0.22 0.09 1.25*** 
DEU - - - 0.97 0.07 2.62*** 
FRA - - - 0.94 0.07 2.55*** 
NOR - - - 1.76 0.08 5.83*** 
SWE - - - 0.61 0.09 1.85*** 
Interactions       
Manual worker 1996 x 2006 -0.16 0.29 0.85 -0.15 0.12 0.86 
White-collar worker 1996 x 2006 -0.05 0.16 0.95 -0.23 0.07 0.80*** 
Left voter 1996 x 2006 -0.06 0.13 0.94 -0.38 0.06 0.68*** 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.08   0.20   
Notes: Significance levels: כ<0.05; ככ<0.01; כככ<0.001. 
21 
 
Despite high unemployment rates amongst young people in Australia at twice the national 
average (OECD, 2012b), there is little evidence of an age effect in the Australian survey data 
(model 1).  With youth unemployment rates in the advanced economies at record levels 
young people (aged 15-24) in the cross-national sample, by contrast, are significantly more 
likely to support state intervention to ensure everyone has jobs than respondents in all other 
age groups (model 2).  Such findings are not altogether surprising.  However, the age effect 
appears absent in Australia.  Women in Australia are significantly more likely to support state 
action to ensure jobs than men.  Education is an important predictor of attitudes in the cross-
national sample but not in the Australian data.  In the general sample, a person with 
educational attainment below degree level is significantly more likely to believe in 
governmental action to ensure everyone has a job.  There has been little overall change in 
Australian attitudes over the last decade and no significant change in attitudes defined by 
either class or partisanship.  According to the survey results, Australians are much less 
inclined to support state intervention in the labour market to ensure workers have jobs than 
citizens in all of the other countries except the UK (observed in model 2).  The highest levels 
of public support for governmental action are to be found in the coordinated economies of 
Northern and Continental Europe.  For example, the odds of a Norwegian citizen claiming 
that the state should ensure all workers have jobs are about six times greater compared to an 
Australian citizen.  In other words, the odds of a Norwegian favouring governmental action to 
ensure jobs is five-hundred-and-eighty-three percent greater than the average Australian, after 
controlling for all other factors. 
The results from the regression analysis can be used to estimate the relative odds of 
favouring collective social policy for representative citizens in each social class (by country) 
in order to understand more about class-based welfare attitudes.  We saw above that 
Australians are more in favour of collective solutions to protect the living standards of 
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unemployed people compared to citizens in the other liberal countries.  Now we are able to 
understand more about the classed effects in the survey data.  The results for manual workers 
in Table 6 are particularly interesting.  Low-skilled manual workers are most likely to 
experience precarious employment and periods of unemployment compared to 
representatives from the other social classes, so their attitudes towards collective social policy 
are particularly relevant here.  Amongst the liberal countries, low-skilled workers in Australia 
are most likely to favour governmental action to protect the living standards of unemployed 
workers.  For example, low-skilled female workers aged 25-44 in Australia have over twice 
the odds of saying the state should act to protect the living standards of unemployed workers, 
compared to low-skilled female workers in the same age group in both Britain and New 
Zealand (Table 6).  We find that the odds of an Australian low-skilled female worker 
favouring governmental action to protect workers are now three times greater compared to 
the same worker in the United States, after controlling for everything else.  In fact, low-
skilled manual workers in Australia are as likely to favour social policy protection as low-
skilled manual workers in the corporatist systems of Germany and France, where capital-
labour arrangements (LQFOXGLQJ ZRUNHUV¶ XQLRQV) look to secure cooperation among the 
classes in order to create decent living standards for labourers.  Only in the Nordic nations do 
we find stronger support amongst manual workers for governmental action to protect the 
living standards of unemployed people, compared to Australia (Table 6).  There is less cross-
national variation in support for collective security amongst middle-class professionals and 
while-collar workers, except for Norway and perhaps Sweden, where solidarity emerges most 
strongly in the survey data.  For example, a low-skilled Norwegian female worker aged 25 
years is now sixteen times more likely to be in favour of social welfare, compared to the 
equivalent Australian.  The equivalent odds for a man are about 15-1. 
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Table 6. Odds of reporting the state is responsible for providing a decent standard of living for 
unemployed people - defined by age, gender, class, and citizenship 
Age Gender EGP class AUS GBR USA NZL FRA DEU NOR SWE 
25-44 Male Professional 1.42 0.95 0.77 1.10 2.56 2.38 8.58 4.22 
" Female " 1.64 1.02 0.82 1.18 2.76 2.56 9.24 4.55 
" Male Salaried white-collar 2.11 1.16 0.94 1.34 3.13 2.90 10.48 9.06 
" Female " 2.52 1.27 1.02 1.46 3.42 3.17 11.44 5.63 
" Male Skilled manual 2.80 1.34 1.08 1.54 3.60 3.34 12.06 5.94 
" Female " 3.24 1.44 1.16 1.66 3.88 3.60 12.98 6.39 
" Male Low-skilled manual 4.17 1.63 1.31 1.88 4.40 4.08 14.72 12.74 
" Female " 4.97 1.78 1.44 2.05 4.80 4.45 16.08 7.91 
55-64 Male Professional 1.23 0.63 0.51 0.73 1.71 1.58 5.72 2.81 
" Female " 1.33 0.96 0.77 1.11 2.58 2.40 8.65 4.26 
" Male Salaried white-collar 1.50 1.09 0.88 1.25 2.93 2.72 9.81 8.49 
" Female " 1.64 1.19 0.96 1.37 3.20 2.97 10.71 5.27 
" Male Skilled manual 1.73 0.89 0.72 1.03 2.40 2.23 8.04 3.96 
" Female " 1.86 0.68 0.55 0.79 1.84 1.70 6.16 3.03 
" Male Low-skilled manual 2.11 0.77 0.62 0.89 2.08 1.93 6.98 6.04 
" Female " 2.31 0.84 0.68 0.97 2.28 2.11 7.62 3.75 
Notes:  aReference category: Professional male aged 15-24 in Australia. 
 
Australian attitudes to unemployment and unemployed people 
So how might we explain the Australian results? There is strong support for universal welfare 
amongst low-skilled manual workers in Australia, while support for selective social policy is 
increasing amongst middle-class voters.  The findings point to the continued relevance of 
class in contemporary society.  Risk society has not dissipated WKHUHOHYDQFHRIFODVVWRRQH¶V
life chances and distribution of risks.  Class continues to be a crucial factor influencing 
beliefs about the functions of the welfare state at a time when the emphasis of social policy is 
no longer exclusively about the protection of working-class families within the capitalist 
state.  In the battle over the political middle ground, middle-class families have been brought 
into the social security system through the mechanisms of tax rebates and credits.  Thus, while 
minimum wage schemes and working tax credits have helped to ensure the welfare system 
always makes work pay, we find that wage replacement rates are relatively low and have 
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fallen in real terms.  In 2005, for example, benefit replacement rates, paid in the initial phase 
of unemployment, for an adult stood at 33 percent of average wages compared to just 23 
percent in 2011 ± a 10 percent fall against average earnings (OECD, 2012a).  Thus, 
Australians appear to accept the risk of a relatively low standard of living if they are unable 
to work or become unemployed.  Benefit levels in Australia continue to be amongst the 
lowest in the Western world; only unemployed adults in the UK receive less (OECD, 2012a). 
 
Discussion 
Leaving aside for the moment questions about the reliability of the cross-national survey data 
underpinning the analyses, we find that the traditional functions of the welfare state (that 
ensure decent living standards in old age and healthcare for the sick) have not lost relevance 
in Australia.  Attitudes towards working-age welfare and government strategies addressing 
the problem of unemployment are more polarized in Australia, however.  The analysis 
suggests that dominant welfare state ideology continues to matter.  In general, support for 
social policy emerges most strongly in the Nordic world, while people in the liberal market 
economies show less positive attitudes towards collective unemployment protection and state 
intervention in the labour market to ensure all workers have jobs.  The Bismarkian nations are 
somewhere in between.  From the analysis reported here, it appears that solidarity with 
unemployed workers has declined in the liberal world across all four RoG waves.  
Nevertheless, declines in welfare solidarity in the coordinated market economies of Europe 
have been relatively modest in comparison to the market liberal states.  Many Australians 
oppose the unconditional welfare state model that provides social security for unemployed 
workers, a finding which is consistent with other national attitudinal surveys (Eardley and 
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Matheson, 1999; Wilson and Meagher, 2007).  Our current analysis enriches the discourse by 
revealing some of the class-based contours in a comparative fashion. 
Work has long been regarded as the best way to secure well-being for Australian families.  
The 2009 Henry Review of the tax system revealed little political appetite for an expanded 
system of welfare paid out of general taxation or out-of-work benefits set at more generous 
levels.  Thus, Australians appear to accept the risk of a relatively low standard of living if 
they are unable to work or become unemployed.  Instead, policymakers have sought to 
maximise employment by securing acceptable conditions of work, including legislative 
measures to ensure a fair minimum wage for workers.  Being out of work and claiming 
benefits from the state have increasingly been defined by policymakers as being problematic; 
dependency is not only detrimental to the moral character of the claimant, but, it is claimed, it 
also erodes the moral life of society more generally.  Unemployed workers are said to be 
PDNLQJ FODLPV RQ VRFLHW\¶V VFDUFH resources, while contributing little, if anything, back to 
society.  As a consequence, work conditionality and regulatory workfare measures appear to 
have found a new level of legitimacy in Australian society at the start of the 21st century.  
While community work programmes and the new sanctions regime introduced by the Liberal-
National coalition government are still in their infancy, we do not know what impact, if any, 
the new right-wing policies will have on people¶s attitudes and values.  Under the coercive 
new workfare programmes, the state is increasingly prepared to PDNHµjobseekers¶ µwork for 
the dole¶ in order to discipline unemployed people.  Clearly, workfare marks a retreat of the 
welfare state, as  workfare arrangements undermine social rights and deter welfare claims, as 
Harris (2001) observes.  If Australians accept the principles underpinning these policies, we 
might expect further declines in public support for the unconditional welfare model that helps 
to mitigate workers¶ exposure to unemployment risk when the RoG survey module is next 
repeated in Australia in 2016. 
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According to the results, solidarity with the working class is weakening in Australia and 
the other market liberal economies.  However, low-skilled workers who experience greater 
job insecurity have a strong desire to see the welfare safety net more securely woven to 
protect their living standards in the event of unemployment.  Socio-economic position 
therefore matters when it comes to welfare state attitudes.  Manual workers are also more 
likely than middle-class professionals to favour governmental action to ensure everyone has a 
job.  Significantly, however, support for these particular welfare state functions has declined 
in Australia over the past decade, particularly amongst white-collar workers.  Australians 
who are more affluent appear to be adopting a tougher line on welfare and are less willing to 
accept or share collective responsibility for unemployment risks than they once were.  It 
appears that white-collar voters are adapting to the activation measures that were put in place 
in the 1990s.  ,Q$XVWUDOLDQVRFLDOSROLF\WHUPV/DERU¶V1994 White Paper, Working Nation, 
represented a radical ideological departure from the traditional role of social security, which 
had hitherto focused on redistributing provisions to support those without work.  Whether this 
downward trend will continue remains to be seen.  Will we see further declines in support for 
collective social policy that guards against unemployment risks, as more affluent citizen¶s 
look to minimise their own personal risk exposures at the expense of others? Will class 
antagonisms appear more or less pronounced when the RoG survey is repeated? 
 
Cautions and further research 
This study examined Australian welfare state attitudes in a comparative perspective, with 
particular attention to the class-attitudes nexus.  We utilized a cross-national collaboration of 
ISSP data spanning four survey waves and a multivariate regression analysis.  A number of 
cautions and suggestions for further research follow. 
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Firstly, we need to know whether (or the extent to which) the RoG is capturing or 
reflecting real and deep-seated value changes in Western societies.  Qualitative inquiry is 
likely to help in this respect.  Often, social surveys (like the RoG) are interested only in 
responses to welfare or social services as if they applied only to others.  We actually need to 
know what kinds of income security people actually want for themselves and their 
dependents.  We also need to know why social security should apply only to older people in 
the liberal market economies.  In other words, we need a deeper understanding of why people 
in different welfare states view the µGHVHUYLQJ needy¶ in different ways: why are unemployed 
people in Norway VHHQ DV µdeserving¶ but not those in Australia, for example? Qualitative 
research might also consider the ways in which working class and middle class 
representatives set about designing their own social policies to cover unemployment risks and 
the interaction between the public and private spheres of decision-making, covering 
insurances, private pensions and other risk-based income maintenance plans.   
Secondly WKH 5R* PRGXOH IRFXVHV RQ WKH µGLUHFW¶ job-creation aspect of labour market 
policy, providing reliable attitudinal trend data on state job-creation strategies from the four 
survey waves.  However, while spending on direct job-creation still accounts for the largest 
FRPSRQHQWRI$/03VSHQGLQJLQWKH2(&'LWLVLQGHFOLQHDQGVSHQGLQJRQµHPSOR\PHQW
LQFHQWLYHV¶ IRU HPSOR\HUV LV increasing (OECD, 2013).  Shifting political priorities are 
particularly important with the more radical US-style workfare programmes gaining 
momentum in the Anglo-World.  In future rounds, therefore, the RoG might look to probe 
public attitudes to ALMPs more closely, including views on the use of employer incentives 
and public investment in training programmes. 
Finally, national panel surveys might be analysed to shed more light on the views of those 
individuals who have changed or modified their own views about the role of government over 
time.  Repeated cross-sectional survey data from the RoG allows attitudes to be estimated 
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only at the aggregate level.  That is, the attitude of each individual is only measured at one 
point in time, meaning that any individual change in attitude cannot be captured. 
Endnotes 
1In the early rounds, occupational coding is country-specific, as national statistical agencies employed 
their own class schemes in the survey. 
2The (pseudo) R-statistic in logistic regression should not be interpreted exactly like R-square in OLS 
(ordinary least-squares) regression, here Nagelkerke R-Squares over 0.2 are considered highly 
satisfactory, particularly in large cross-national samples. 
3Far-reaching governmental actions and policies for promoting full employment should not be 
confused with the coercive processes now employed by the Australian (workfare) state, whereby 
jobseekers must now undertake community work in exchange for benefits.   
4In 2011, for example, public expenditure on ALMPs in Denmark was 2.3 percent of GDP compared 
to just 0.3 percent in Australia. 
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